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Motto:
"[The FAA] reflects a federal policy favoring actual arbitration - that is,
arbitration as a streamlined 'method of resolving disputes, 'not as a
foolproof way of killing off valid claims."2
-Justice Elena Kagan
ABSTRACT:
This article examines whether the U.S. Supreme Court's recent rulings
favoring arbitration is compatible with public policies that protect consumers
from abusive debt-collection practices. In addition to policy issues raised by
the "arbitrability" of consumer protection clauses, this paper argues that the
"arbitrability" of abusive debt collection practices raises specific concerns.
Specifically, the arbitration of such clauses brings into conflict two federal
acts-the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which both promote important public policies. Which
should prevail? By analyzing the "clash of policies" in a consumer-debtor
protection context, the author contends that public interest should prevail over
private interests. The article concludes with recommendations calling for a
complete ban of arbitration in consumer disputes concerning abusive debt
collection practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of expanding the use of arbitration to
consumer related issues is part of a wider process of externalization of
former public-sector responsibilities. The privatization of central
services in society-in this case replacing parts of the judicial system
such as courts with private actors-is a common tendency in the U.S.,
Canada, and the European Union. Often times, states and judges
encourage such privatization.3 This phenomenon takes different forms
2 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013)
(Kagan, E., dissenting) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
3TREVOR C.W. FARROW, CIVEL JUSTICE, PRIVATIZATION, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 156
(2014) (noting that "[n]otwithstanding the significant judicial support for ADR initiatives,
it is important to recognize that this support is not without some reservation.").
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on the two sides of the Atlantic, however, the same questions and
concerns are troublesome in both regions.
To be able to distinguish between private and public interests
that are supported by strong public policies is relevant to the matter at
hand. Whether enforcement of consumer rights is deemed either a
matter of general, public interest or one which regards private interests,
may have different implications and results. The important question
considers the purpose of arbitration in the consumer context. Is there a
purpose or a need for arbitration in consumer related matters? What kind
of interests does it serve: private or public? What purpose does
enforcement of consumer protection laws serve? Are those purposes
maintained or affected by arbitration or ADR mechanisms? These
questions will provide the answer to the title of this article.
In the following subsections, the paper addresses the factors
affecting enforcement of consumer protection, the implications of the
different interests pursued by the public policies behind consumer
protection and arbitration, and whether there is a need for arbitration or
ADR in consumer-debtor disputes at all.
A. Factors Affecting Enforcement of Consumer Protection
Law
Consumer protection provisions and statutes carry no meaning
unless they can be effectively enforced. Therefore, it is not only the
absence of an enforcement mechanism, but also the presence of an
inefficient or insufficient one that can result in lack of redress: a mere
duty to return only ill-gotten gains after the perpetrator has been
caught.4 Another avenue for redress is prosecuting the perpetrator under
criminal law, which does not address consumer issues and places limits
on persons seeking enforcement. Ultimately, limits on available
enforcement mechanisms are among the improper ways to ensure
enforcement.6
The effectiveness of enforcement depends also on the behavior
of and the powers granted to the interested subjects. For instance, a
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potential issue affecting enforcement is the reluctance or the
impossibility of the consumers to assert their ights. Consumers must
act in order for the enforcement mechanism, as proper as it may be, to
become effective. If consumers do not complain about the abuse, then
their legal rights are rendered totally useless. Hence, consumers must
be informed and aware of their rights and act without hesitation to get
them. Lack of education also falls into the category of issues that have
an impact on enforcement for such a consumer, even if informed, might
lack the capacity to properly understand their rights and act upon them.7
Enforcement may be difficult due to economic reasons as well.
In general, people are reluctant to utilize the courts even when the law
provides for such a mechanism because trials are long, expensive, and
risky. If one adds to this the fact that the consumer-related ispute might
be smaller than the cost of litigation, the consumer will be deterred from
taking action for the costs outweigh the benefits. Once again, the
possibility to address the court as an enforcement mechanism is severely
impaired. In such instances, the access to administrative types of redress
via recourse to a public agency might be the only option left. However,
public enforcement brings only little and indirect benefits to consumers.
Last, but not least, enforcement is affected by the very
businesses that might be subjected to it, via contractual terms requiring
consumers to submit any claim to arbitration. Such clauses impose
further restraints on enforceability of consumer rights by expressly
banning the use of class actions, eliminating the recovery of attorney
fees by consumers, avoiding jury trials as well as possibilities for
7 Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey ofPerceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress,
II L. & Soc'Y REv. 701, 703 (1977) (discussing a survey that is still relevant today, the
authors observe that "throughout the complaint process, people of low education, income,
and social status are underrepresented."); see Amy Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies
in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 279, 302 (2012) (affirming Best and
Andreasen's 1977 study, the author notes that "[riesponse data confirmed research and
theory suggesting that education influences consumer complaints. There was a significant
positive association between education level and likelihood to notice anything about
arbitration in consumer purchase terms .... This comports with other research indicating
that consumers with less education are less likely to perceive purchase problems or assert
their complaints.").
' Schmitz, supra note 7, at 313 (explaining that "[i]ncome and education therefore
play significant roles in determining consumers' likelihood to complain and pursue their
rights with respect to their purchases.").
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appeal, using potential biased arbitrators and non-transparent
procedures, circumventing the use of public courts in resolving
disputes, and even obtaining decisions not based on law or legal
precedents.9
This paper focuses mainly on the last enforcement issue,
although overlaps with the other three may also be mentioned. As it was
stated, businesses now impose contractual terms by which consumers
are waiving their statutory rights to a judicial process and opt for an
extra-judicial one. The thin line between private interests (expressed in
the parties' agreement) and the public interests (expressed in the
statutory provisions) is discussed in greater detail in the following
subsection.
B. The Thin Line Between Public and Private Interests
Opting for arbitration or other ADR mechanism is, beyond
doubt, a private interest matter, for dispute resolution clauses that opt
out of the public court system are mere contractual provisions.'0 This
explains why private actors (such as arbitrators and mediators) exhibit
a more market and business oriented approach by focusing on
maintaining good-will and addressing the dispute as purely contractual.
Since the dispute is perceived as private, they are less concerned with
the punitive and/or deterrent effect of their decisions with respect to
potential similar disputes that may arise. Each problem will be assessed
as unique and not as one that might or might not generate binding case
law.'1
Conversely, public bodies (such as courts and agencies) are
more concerned with procedural safeguards, the observance of statutory
rights, and the future effects of their decisions. The problem is assessed
9 SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 950. See also Schmitz, supra note 7, at 312 (using
empirical evidence to support the conclusion that these clauses restrict consumer rights.
Schmitz concludes "[t]he SWS hinders this consumer's empowerment by suppressing
information sharing and consumer's pursuit of contract claims.").
0 NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDERN, & MARTIN HUNTER,
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INT'L ARBITRATION 2 (6th ed. 2015) (explaining that arbitration
is an "informal and essentially private and consensual system of dispute resolution.").
I Richard M. Alderman, The Future of Consumer Law in the United States-As the
Civil Justice System Goes, so Goes Consumer Law 13 (British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, Working Paper, 2006).
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as a potential part of a repetitive process, which needs to take into
account previous decisions (if any) or future ones. Therefore, the
deterrent and punitive effect bears a larger significance, in order to
ensure that the violating party is aware of the consequences and will not
repeat its behavior, while the rest of the public will be informed that its
statutory rights are upheld and duly enforced.12
Increased use of private actors-arbitrators, mediators,
adjudicators-as providers and guarantors of public services brings
concerns related to reduction and elimination, as well as to control of
access to civil justicel3 and the concomitant issue of responsibility and
liability of these service providers, who may be driven by commercial
incentives, rather than public interest. A number of surveys and reports
in the U.S. on the use of arbitration in consumer matters, have already
pointed out that arbitrators may be biased due to the 'repeat-player'4
advantage' mechanism, which means that by ruling in favor of the
industries they increase their chances to be re-appointed in future
cases." Such form of pressure, although not necessarily singular or a
general one, is sufficient to illustrate a genuine concern-that
privatization of the dispute resolution process gives control over the
outcome and the forum.1 6
The 'repeat player advantage' has also a facet that places the
consumer at yet another great disadvantage. Unlike commercial
arbitration where both parties have the same potential of being involved
in future disputes and exercise equal influence over the selection
process, in consumer arbitration it is only one party that is involved in
multiple arbitrations-the business. This decreases the consumers'
chances for they are less able to obtain information regarding other
12 Id. at 4.
13 Id. at 2-3.
14 Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267
(1995).
15 KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 23
(2015); Budnitz, supra note 14, at 293.
"6Alderman, supra note 11, at 9.
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arbitration decisions17 and lack the economic power to put up a strong
case. At the same time, one may address the potential responsibility of
the public sector that agreed to have parts of its functions privatized.
The goal of privatization is to increase the quality and efficiency
of services offered, 1 8 mainly by removing monopoly and providing
options that will increase competition among providers and the
participation of citizens.19 With respect to dispute resolution however,
especially one meant to circumvent resort to public courts, the removal
of public courts and the guarantees offered for due process, is in fact
part of the problem. If one may find justifications for it-such as the
need of individuals or businesses for swift and confidential dispute
resolution20 and enforcement of rights-it is not less true that private
'for-profit' organizations providing ADR services may have an adverse
effect on the benefits inherent in the public nature of the judicial system,
such as transparency2 1 and predictability22 via uniform and consistent,_
application of the law.2 3 Moreover, predominantly in the U.S. resort to
ADR removes the gap-fulfilling role of courts that are dealing with
matters which slipped through the cracks of legislation or were ignored
by it.24
The above is not to be construed in the sense that the two-
public justice and private dispute resolution-have necessarily
conflicting interests. It proves that they do have, however, a different
focus, which generates particular types of results. For instance, the EU's
approach is that consumer protection is a private matter (at its
inception), which the consumer is free to address via ADR, provided
ADR mechanisms remain "alternative" and ensure a swift and
" Id at 13. See, e.g., Donna M. Bates, A Consumer's Dream or Pandora's Box: Is
Arbitration a Viable Option for Cross-Border Consumer Disputes? 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
823 (2003).
18 FARROW, supra note 3, at 55.
19 See id at 189-90.
20 Id.at 60.
2 1Id. at 62 (expressing that "one of the central goals of the privatization movement-
from an informational perspective-is typically to move disputes out of the public eye and
into confidential, or at least largely private, in-camera settings.").
22 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY. REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT §1028(a) (2015), Appendix A, Preliminary Results 2013, p. 7.
23 Alderman, supra note 11, at 6.
24 Id at 6.
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convenient result to the consumer's needs. Where the result is not
satisfactory, the consumer maintains the option to bring the issue into a
public forum and thus make use of all statutory and procedural rights at
their disposal. The United States' approach is still not fully decided.
While the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court justices appear to see no
danger associated with arbitration, 25 there are voices that claim
arbitration is about modification of substantive rights by reducing
number of disputes, avoiding courts and juries, thus becoming a
mechanism of circumventing courts.26 The question which arises is
whether arbitration and ADR mechanisms are needed in consumer
related dispute at all, and it is answered in the following subsection.
C. Is There a Need for Arbitration and ADR Mechanisms in
Consumer Related Disputes?
A survey conducted in 1977 on Consumer Response to
Unsatisfactory Purchases identified that in cases where consumers took
action in order to enforce their rights, the most common one was "to
voice a complaint to the seller/retailer/service outlet/manufacturer
(30.7% of the cases),"2 7 while the least common was to complain to or
via a third party (business/professional associations, public agencies,
lawyers or courts) (3.7% of all instances in which consumers who
noticed problems voiced complaints).28 Such small figures led the
survey's authors to conclude that: "sellers have a near perfect monopoly
on complaint handling. They can feel free to impose their own
standards for complaint resolution confident that consumers will not
make use of the third-party mechanisms to review their actions."29
2s Given the effective vindication rule set out in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the two positions are not prima facie
irreconcilable in the sense that the pro-arbitration approach of the Supreme Court was not
to be used for depriving any of the arbitrating parties of their statutory rights. However,
the effective vindication rule appears to have been disregarded in the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, which constituted, for instance, the reason for the dissenting opinion
of Justice Kagan in American Express Co. v Italian Colors restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013).
26 Alderman, supra note 11, at 8.
27 Best & Andreasen, supra note 7, at 712.
28 Id. at 713.
29 Id. at 714.
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The results were later confirmed by another survey from 2012,
which further added that: "[t]he SWS3 0 is therefore similar to arbitration
and other private settlement processes in that it allows companies to
privatize or internalize complaint resolution. It also hinders
development of the law and limits public access to information
regarding faulty products and company improprieties."31 In such cases,
one may wonder, is there any need for arbitration and other ADR
mechanisms in consumer related disputes? Does arbitration play any
role, besides depriving consumers of their rights and incentives, which
obviously satisfies the interests of corporations?
The same survey answers positively. The perception in the U.S.
is that arbitration or ADR is not per se bad and detrimental to
consumers. However, this statement is subjected to a few qualifications:
"[t]hey can be beneficial when fairly and properly monitored and
administered, especially in basic contract disputes or intercommunal
contexts in which parties share power and understandings."32 There are,
generally, certain advantages associated with arbitration, which is
perceived as less time consuming, less cumbersome, and less costly than
litigation.3 3 At the same time, arbitrators might have greater expertise
than a judge.3 4
Nonetheless, the number of disadvantages to consumers
associated with arbitration seems to outweigh any benefits: waiver of
fact-finding by a jury of their peers or to have the trial presided over by
a judge; surrender of the right to full discovery; no possibility for
appeal; no requirement for the arbitrator to rule according to the law or
prior precedents; lack of transparency; distant, possibly biased and
private forums; impossibility to resort to class actions or class
arbitration which would lead to punitive damages; loss of statutory
" The acronym "SWS" refers to the notion of "squeaky wheels" individuals who are
proactive in pursuing their needs and complaints-and thus are most likely to get the
assistance, remedies, and other benefits they seek. The author of the survey refers to it as
a system, hence, SWS. (Squeaky Wheel System).
31 Schmitz, supra note 7, at 317.
32 Id at 317. See also SPANOGLE, supra note 5, at 988, for a business-oriented
perspective of advantages of arbitration in consumer related disputes.
* See FARROW, supra note 3, at 194-95 (detailing advantages associated with
arbitration and ADR mechanisms).
3" See generally Budnitz, supra note 14.
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procedural advantages incentivizing private action (attorney fees, costs,
statutory damages).3 5
Similar arguments are raised in favor of arbitration and other
ADR mechanisms in the EU as well, not without emphasizing the
detrimental effects of arbitration in U.S. consumer disputes.3 6 The EU's
position appears to be that arbitration and ADR are useful and
recommended in those instances where the costs, length, and formalities
of litigation would affect consumer redress. Thus, alternative, more
flexible, friendlier, and cheaper means of redress are preferred, provided
they serve the purpose of enforcing consumers' rights, and do not have
the opposite effect, like in the U.S. It is one of the major differences in
the approaches taken by the two mentioned jurisdictions. One may
wonder how it is possible that starting from the same basis and
perception, the two have ended up with such opposing results. One
answer may come from the way the U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to
enforce the federal policy favoring arbitration to the detriment of state
consumer laws, a judicial development absent from the EU. It
constitutes the focus of the next section.
" A CLASH OF POLICIES: THE CURRENT APPROACH OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT TOWARDS ARBITRABILITY AND ADR
MECHANISMS IN CONSUMER RELATED DISPUTES
In the U.S., the balance between state policies in the field of
consumer protection and a federal policy promoting arbitration has been
tilted in the favor of the latter. If pre-dispute arbitration clauses in B2B
contracts have been long accepted and used as private and efficient
mechanisms of resolving disputes, their insertion and application to
" Spanogle supra note 5, at 987. See also Budnitz, supra note 14, at 283-87
(explaining the disadvantages of arbitration and provides a summary of available case law).36 HANS-W MICKLTIZ, ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONSUMER LAW 512-
13 (2010) (discussing that "ADR schemes ... try to cure the perceived deficiencies of
'traditional' in-court litigation, which is often considered too expensive, too formalistic
and slow.... Their flexibility also allows for the development of true alternatives to in-
court litigation, with more room for specialization and more room for a different, more
consensus-based approach allowing parties to resume a dialogue instead of being each
other's opponents. It is possible to distinguish between truly voluntary schemes which
increase consumer rights and minimize costs on the one hand and those schemes, such as
some arbitration schemes (especially in the US-that rather limit consumer rights.").
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labor and consumer (B2C) contracts remained problematic. In the U.S.,
domestic arbitration became strictly enforced by the Federal Arbitration
Act (the FAA), Chapter 1.3 7 However, the most important role in
supporting this approach belongs to the U.S. Supreme Court, which,
through a constant case law, has admonished states that found
arbitration as not the appropriate venue in consumer contracts. By doing
so, the Supreme Court has in fact limited the power of a state to regulate
consumer arbitration provisions, beyond the application of general
defenses in contract law.38
A 2015 Briefing Paper of the Economic Policy Institute actually
nominates the Supreme Court as the main culprit in enabling
corporations "to force customers . . into arbitration to adjudicate
practically all types of alleged violations of countless state and federal
laws designed to protect citizens against consumer fraud, unsafe
products, and other forms of corporate wrongdoing." 39 The paper
provides a comprehensive history of the judicial developments starting
in the 1980s when the U.S. Supreme Court began promoting a strong
pro-arbitration policy on the basis of the FAA, constantly expanding the
FAA's scope, all based on a legal presumption that in case of doubt on
whether a particular dispute comes within an arbitration clause, courts
should resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration. 40 Thus, the FAA
applies to disputes over contracts that are brought in state courts as well,
provided the dispute involves interstate commerce, and preempts any
state law with which it conflicts, 41 and it also covers statutory
disputes.42
The expansion of scope was doubled by a constant rebuff of any
attempts by states to enact legislation that would insulate consumers
from being subjected to arbitration agreements. Hence, laws that
3 Amy Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer A bitration, 10 LoY. U. CHI.
INT'L L. REV. 81, 82 (2012).
3 1 d at 83.
39 Stone, supra note 15, at 3.
' See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983).
41 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1984) (concluding that an
arbitration clause that is enforceable in federal court is also enforceable in state court).
42 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(holding that an agreement o arbitrate a statutory claim is valid and that there is a strong
presumption favoring arbitration in international commerce).
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imposed rules to ensure that consumers were aware of their consent to
arbitration, 43 or made composite arbitration clauses class action waiver
unconscionable in consumer cases were struck down as restrictive of
arbitration and preempted by the FAA," or where the contract was
governed by state and not federal law. 45 Different defenses raised
against arbitration agreements, such as costly procedures,
46 illegality, 47
unconscionability, 48 or unenforceability 49 were dismissed by the
Supreme Court's case law on the basis of the doctrine of severability of
arbitration clauses from the contract. In addition to that, while it
expanded the scope of the FAA, the Supreme Court has narrowed the
standard for the judicial review of arbitral awards, making it harder for
consumers to appeal an arbitral decision in court by holding that parties
are precluded from agreeing to have a court review a decision of an
arbitral tribunal.o
All of the above seem to suggest that in the clash of policies, the
pro-arbitration policy of the FAA has prevailed over consumer
protection policies. However, things may not be as clear-cut as they
appear. The U.S. Supreme Court maintains that arbitration is
appropriate only where it does not involve a loss of statutory rights (the
"effective-vindication rule"). This principle was expressed " in the
famous Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, where the
court held that a party may be required to arbitrate a claim arising under
a law, only if said party "may vindicate its statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum," 52 and further added that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute."53
It must be emphasized here that since state laws limiting or
regulating the use of arbitration agreements were struck down by the
4Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
"See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
4 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463, 467 (2015).
"Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
47 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).
48 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 65 (2010).
4Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397 (1967).
o Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008).
s See FARROw, supra note 3.
52 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
5 Id. at 628.
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court as preempted by the FAA, the statutory rights used in arbitration
proceedings are only those arising from federal law. However, as the
Supreme Court mentioned, provided that these rights are not affected
by the proceedings, arbitration cannot be avoided. Given that there is no
case involving claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) and arbitration that has reached the Supreme Court, just
how the clash between the policies behind these two federal statutes will
be resolved remains open for discussion and for any result.
III. FROM GENERAL TO SPECIFIC: THE CASE OF ABUSIVE DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES DISPUTES
If the matter of arbitrability and enforceability of consumer
protection in general appears to be settled, at least in the light of U.S.
Supreme Court case law, the case of arbitrability of abusive debt
collection practices disputes remains less clear. The following sections
elaborate on what makes this particular type of disputes special,
differentiating them from other consumer related disputes, and
emphasize the wide palette of incentives and remedies for private action
implemented via the FDCPA that serve as tools for enforcement of what
the act deems public interest.
D. Why are Abusive Debt Collection Practices and Financial
Services More "Special"?
The uniqueness of consumer claims under the FDCPA has
already been pointed out by Alderman.54 However, for the purposes of
this article, the problems identified and the suggested solutions, a short
overview of his arguments is necessary.
Alderman's starting point is the definition given by the FDCPA
to debt collectors, and he rightfully concludes that by law, any FDCPA
claim will involve what he calls a "non-party."ss Since debt collectors
hired by the original creditor to recover the debt are third-parties to the
54 Richard M. Alderman, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Meets Arbitration:
Non-Parties andArbitration, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 586, 587-89 (2012).
s Id at 587 (stating that according to the definition of debt collectors adopted by the
FDCPA, original creditors are excluded from the coverage of the act; thus, its subjects will
always be third-parties hired to collect the debt on behalf of the original creditor).
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original agreement, they are not usually covered by the consumer's
agreement containing the arbitration clause. Non-parties are also
involved in. other financial related services-such as self-help
repossession-where secured creditors resort to third party re-
possessors to enforce their UCC Article 9 rights under the security
agreement.
One must not disregard the fact that arbitration is a contractual
matter, in the sense that there must be an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate that covers the dispute. This poses the following two important
questions regarding a debt collector under the FDCPA: on the one hand,
whether the dispute is covered by the scope of an arbitration agreement
between the creditor and the debtor and, on the other hand, whether the
clause is enforceable by or against the debt collector, who is not party
to the original contract. According to Alderman, the answer to the first
question is to be found in the wording of the agreement, which means
that where the language expressly defines claims subject to arbitration
to include claims against debt collectors, the matter will be subjected to
arbitration and vice versa.5 6 Based on a decision by the Supreme Court,
an arbitration clause may be enforceable upon a non-party on the basis
of agency and equitable estoppel doctrines.57 However, with respect to
debt collectors, after analyzing a significant number of cases, Alderman
shows that only equitable estoppel (a state law doctrine) may be used
by non-parties as a viable basis for enforcing an arbitration clause.5 8
Since the wording of the arbitration clauses does not affect the policies
backing arbitration and protection of debtors against abusive debt
collection practices, the article will not investigate this matter any
further.
6 Id. at 593-95. In practice, the issue is not that easy, for the language might leave
room for different interpretations. For instance, in McCracken v. Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, 279 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), the lower court denied a request for arbitration
because the agreement did not specifically state that it applies also to "successors and
assigns." The appellate court took a different view, holding that "the scope of the
arbitration provision is broad enough" to include the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant that resulted from the lender's assignment of its right to receive the loan
payments.
* Arthur Anderson LLP v. Wayne Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 632 (2009).
5 Alderman, supra note 54, at 596-99.
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E. The Policy Issues in Arbitration ofAbusive Debt Collection
Practices Disputes
Another part of Alderman's argument is the size of the industry,
which brings with it a vast opportunity for abuse that the FDCPA was
designed, from its outset, to deter by providing consumers with
adequate compensation and providing a level playing field within which
ethical collectors are not competitively disadvantaged. 5 As such,
Alderman states that the policy considerations of the FDCPA differ
from those that regularly arise when determining the validity and
enforceability of agreement between immediate parties or between non-
parties involved in other situations.60
F. The FDCPA: Incentives and Remedies for Private Action
When the FDCPA was enacted in 1977, Congress made a very
clear statement with respect to its three-pronged purpose: "eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors . .. insure that those
debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices
are not competitively disadvantaged, and ... promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses."61 All three
of the purposes have a strong public interest implication.
1. THE PUBLIC INTERESTS OF THE FDCPA
The FDCPA is concerned with debt collection as a widespread
process and phenomenon affecting the general public. In other words,
it is less concerned with a particular phone call or letter than with the
practice itself. This is reflected by the factors which should be of
concern to courts in the assessment of debt collectors' civil liability:
"the frequency and persistence of noncompliance," "the nature of ...
noncompliance," "the extent to which the debt collector's
9 Id at 588-89.
6 Id at 600.
1 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692a § 802(e) (2010) (addressing
Congressional findings and declaration of purpose) (emphasis added).
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noncompliance was intentional," "the resources of the debt collector,"
and "number of persons adversely affected."62
Prohibition of unfair competition is the second major public
policy of the drafters of the FDCPA.63 In general, the intent behind
competition laws is to protect the process of competition and maximize
consumer welfare. 6 Therefore, the purpose of this stated policy is not
only the protection of consumers, but also of fair competitors. The
reason is that absence of consistent and adequate action against unfair
or abusive practices may put fair competitors at a disadvantage. The
drafter's intent of consistent enforcement of the FDCPA to ensure fair
competition is emphasized by the choice of the administrative
enforcer-the Federal Trade Commission (FTC): "For the purpose of
the exercise by the Federal Trade Commission of its functions and
powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act [1914 (FTCA 1914)],
a violation of this subchapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of that Act." 65 Hence, any violation of the
FDCPA is held to be also a violation of FTCA 1914, which prohibits
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting trade, interpreted in a wider manner by courts to include
conduct that runs counter to established public policy.66
The consistent state action to which the federal act refers was
promoted primarily through private litigation, an option deeply
embedded in the U.S. perspective on enforcement.67 The FDCPA was
to be a self-enforcing statute, "with private individual and class actions
62 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692a § 813(b)(2) (addressing civil
liability factors considered by the court).
6 In practice, the FTC's work is not confined to competition, for it is currently
receiving support from both the Bureau of Consumer Protection and the Bureau of
Economics. The FTC takes formal enforcement action under the law when it considers it
necessary so as to protect consumers and plays an important role in research and legislative
recommendations with respect to competition and consumer protection topics. MAHER M.
DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 237 (Maher M. Dabbah
& Barry Hawk eds., 2010).
* As of 2010, the Dodd Frank Act transferred the FTC's functidAs under the FDCPA
to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW 700 (7th ed. 2013).
6 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692m § 814(a) (addressing
administrative enforcement; Federal Trade Commission).
' DABBAH, supra note 63, at 245.
67 Bates, supra note 17, at 844.
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providing collectors with a powerful incentive to comply with the
statute."6 8 Thus, private action rather than government enforcement
was, in the Congress' perspective, the main means of promoting industry
compliance with the law.6 9 The public interest here is intertwined with
private interests, for in fact, the aggrieved debtors are turned into "a
private attorney general" thus creating a strong incentive for private
enforcement.70
2. FINANCIAL AND PROCEDURAL INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE
ACTION
In 2009, the FTC 7 1 still believed that "it is important for the
FDCPA to be primarily a self-enforcing statute as Congress intended."72
The reason was that the number of abusive debt collection complaints
received each year7 3 did not make it feasible for the federal government
law enforcement to be the exclusive and primary means of deterring
violations.7 4 In other words, there was not enough money and personnel
to handle all FDCPA infringements at an administrative level. As such,
the FTC concluded: "[p]rivate actions ... are critical in deterring those
who would violate the FDCPA." 75
In this context, private action is to be understood as private civil
litigation. Private civil litigation would result in public decisions
intended to create a binding precedent and bring consistency in
6 8 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES
OF CHANGE 66 (2009).69 
Id
70 Steven G. Potach, New Protection Against the Unethical Bill Collector: Debtors'
Remedies Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 895, 923
(1978).
7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692m § 814 (addressing
administrative enforcement; Federal Trade Commission).
72 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION, supra note 68.
71 In 2009 the number of complaints received by the FTC per year was more than
70,000. In 2016, the figure is above 85,000, which makes debt collection the largest source
of consumer complaints in the US. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2016).
74 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 67.
75 Id
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interpretation. 76 To that end, Congress provided the aggrieved
consumer-debtors with several financial and procedural incentives to
encourage private action. First, it stated that in addition to the actual
damage incurred by the consumer, the court was free to award
"statutory" damages for "any violation" in an amount not exceeding
$1000.n7 Second, it specifically allowed for class actions.78 Third, it
capped statutory damages for a class action at the lesser of $500,000 or
one percent of the debt collector's net worth.7 9 Fourth, it provided that
in case of a successful enforcement action, both the costs of the action
and reasonable attorney's fees (as determined by the court) were to be
paid to the consumer by the debt collector.8 0 Last, it authorized (with
minor exceptions) a choice of venue for the consumer, enabling them to
bring action in any "appropriate United States district court without
regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction. . . ."81
3. THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE ACTION
Another strong argument in favor of private action through
public litigation is that the public courts' powers are not limited only to
protection of individual consumers. They can also set guidance for debt
collectors, indicating not only what they cannot do, but also what they
7 Alderman, supra note 54, at 602 (stating that with respect to consistency of
interpretation, one must not neglect the possibility of the court to address new technologies
and innovative collection practices, which did not exist at the time when the FDCPA was
adopted; given that a Congressional amendment can be long and cumbersome, change can
come from courts).
" Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 16921 §813 (a)(1)-(a)(2) (addressing
civil liability; amount of damages).
7 8 Id. The public policy rationales behind arbitration and those behind class actions
are at odds, especially when it comes to consumer protection. It is worth noting here that
unlike the U.S., where the Supreme Court has upheld class action waivers in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), Italian Colors v. American Express,
570 U.S. 228 (2013), and DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct 463 (2016), in neighboring
Canada the courts interpret consumer legislation as evidencing legislative intent to allow
class actions even where an arbitration clause is present. See Wellman & Corless v. TELUS
& Bell, 2014 ONSC 3318 (CanLII), where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice certified
a class proceeding despite an arbitration clause being present in the consumer contract.
" Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(2)(B) (2006).
80 d. at 15 U.S.C §1692k(a)(3).
81 Id. at 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d).
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should do in order to comply with the FDCPA, something which
arbitration or any other ADR mechanism cannot deliver.82 As such, in
the case of arbitration, other debt collectors would not know how to
avoid future liability. On the premise that the FDCPA is based on
consistent rules and guidance for both consumers and businesses
involved in debt collection, arbitration frustrates Congress' intent.83
There are also significant differences with regard to the length
to which a public court would go, in comparison with arbitration, to not
frustrate the purpose of the FDCPA. In the famous West v. Costen,84 in
order to enforce the sanctions under the FDCPA, the court went as far
as piercing the corporate veil,85 holding that:
[I]t would be unfair to the plaintiffs and contrary to the
purpose of the FDCPA to uphold MSF's corporate
facade. Although some issues still remain for trial, upon
undisputed facts MSF is liable to the plaintiffs for some
blatantly illegal collection practices. Yet MSF is no
longer doing business ... and it thus seems likely that its
assets, if any remain, will be totally inadequate to meet
plaintiffs' damages . . . Furthermore, the FDCPA's
purpose to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors," 15 U.S.C. §1692a, would be
frustrated if MSF's corporate fagade was an effective
shield against persons seeking their private remedies
under the Act.86
82 Alderman, supra note 11, at 602. Alderman uses as an example the decision in
Barlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997), where the judge proposed a "safe
harbor" letter for the debt collectors to use in order to avoid the type of dispute posed by
the case. By doing so, the decision ensured not only remedies and relief for the aggrieved
consumer, but also that other debt collectors will be able to avoid liability while still in full
compliance with the law. This type of decision protects both the interests of other
consumer-debtors and debt collectors.
8 Id. at 603.
* West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 564-88 (W.D. Va. 1983).
8 See Alexandra Horvathova & Catalin Gabriel Stanescu, Piercing the Corporate
Veil: US Lessons for Romania and Slovakia, 17 CI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3-4
(2016) (discussing the case and the application of the veil piercing doctrine).
86 Costen, 558 F. Supp. at 587.
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The court's position is clear and self-explanatory; any obstacle
that would frustrate liability of the debt collector and the enforcement
of the FDCPA must be surpassed, otherwise the law would be reduced
to mere letters with no effect.
In the light of all the above, the question would then be, why
allow or go to arbitration at all if the end result is the frustration of the
law. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the matter involving the
conflict between the FDCPA's purposes and those of the FAA;
therefore, one cannot finger-point in its direction, like in the case of
general consumer protection issues. However, that is not to say the case
law of the Supreme Court bears no implications in this area. So far, the
Supreme Court has pushed in the direction of privatization of the
judicial system by upholding and expanding the scope of arbitration
beyond its original intent. It is the shift from public to private interests
that explains the wide pro-arbitration trend and it is the same shift that,
purposely or not, ended up stripping the consumer of all the statutory
incentives provided by the FDCPA and circumventing the courts.
IV. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSALS
Since the issue of consumer protection and its general conflict
with arbitration has been present for the past thirty years, there is a
significant amount of literature addressing it. There have been proposals
from consumer organizations, state agencies, or scholars on how to
address and solve the conflict. Two main categories of proposals have
emerged: one suggests an amendment o the FAA to exclude or limit its
application to consumer protection matter; the second advocates the
implementation of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) to deal with
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. In other words, the advocates
of reform want to put back the "alternative" in the alternative dispute
resolution.
A. Amendment of the FAA
In one of the few articles dedicated to arbitrability of unfair debt
collection practices, Alderman maintained that the proper solution for
preventing arbitration from degenerating consumers' rights under the
FDCPA is changing the federal law, namely by amending the FAA.
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This is a solution that is supported by other scholars as well, with respect
to consumer protection arbitration in general.87 His proposal was to
insert a provision precluding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts from extending to non-party disputes and to permit parties to
agree on arbitration only after a dispute arose.88
B. Fairness in Arbitration Act
A more powerful and direct solution supported by Alderman and
consumer advocates89 is the implementation of AFA of 2011, which
would prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses in all consumer
contracts.90 This act states among the findings section, which led to its
drafting, that "[m]andatory arbitration undermines the development of
public law because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate
judicial review of arbitrators' decisions."91 So far, the act did not receive
congressional support. However, one must notice that from the
perspective of public versus private interests, such a solution banning
only mandatory pre-dispute arbitration would not solve much.
Cconsumer-debtors would still be in the position to have their statutory
rights removed by an arbitration clause, which would end up frustrating
the purpose of the FDCPA. For this reason, the article's conclusion
proposes a third option.
VI. CONCLUSION-REFORMING THE FDCPA
This article contends that in a conflict between the public
policies of the federal act banning abusive debt collection practices
(FDCPA) and the pro-arbitration public policy (FAA), the former must
take precedence over the latter. Hence, not only pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration should be banned from the area of abusive debt collection
practices, but arbitration altogether.
8 Bates, supra note 17, at 897.
8 Alderman, supra note 54, at 611-12.; Alderman, supra note 11, at 17.
89 Stone, supra note 14, at 25. The authors of the report claim that the AFA is "the best
hope for stopping these trends and restoring justice to ordinary citizens. It is crucial that
this act gets the support of everyone who believes that consumer and employee rights are
important and worth protecting."
'Alderman, supra note 54, at 612; Schmitz, supra note 37, at 83.
9' S. 1133, 114th Cong. Arbitration Fairness Act §2 (emphasis added).
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There are three main arguments to support this position. First,
there is a chronological argument. The FAA was adopted in 1925,
while the FDCPA was adopted in 1977. As the newer rule, the policies
behind the FDCPA should count as exempted from the general policy
behind the FAA. Second, while the FAA constitutes a general, broader
rule regarding pro-arbitration policies in consumer matters, the FDCPA
may be deemed lex specialis, a narrower rule in consumer matters due
to the nature of claims and the involvement of non-parties. As such, the
FDCPA should be perceived as an exception meant to ensure the
enforcement of the three public policies mentioned in Subsection 3.3.1.
Third, the FDCPA was enacted as a minimum standard of protection
from which states cannot derogate. Thus, it is a matter of public interest
and its subjects cannot waive the statutory minimum protection,
otherwise any law could be eventually contracted out.
Given that conflicts between other federal consumer laws (i.e.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) and the FAA have resulted in
inconsistent judicial results,9 2 and that allegations of inherent conflicts
between arbitration and the underlying purposes of other statues have
been rejected by the Supreme Court, the proper solution in this article's
view is to amend the FDCPA and expressly state that matters covered
by the act may not be subject to arbitration. Since the FAA expresses a
statutory policy, the legislator has the possibility to preclude arbitration
or other ADR mechanisms and allow a statutory right to either ajudicial
remedy or a trial by jury. Thus, the legislator would make clear its
intention to keep certain types of disputes in the exclusive domain of
the courts for purposes of public policy and public interest.9 3
' Bates, supra note 17, at 848 n.102 (2004).
93 Julia H~rmle, Legal Controls on the Use ofArbitration Clause in B2C E-Commerce
Contracts, 1 MASARYK UNIV. J.L. & TECH. 23, 27 (2008); see Peter J. Boyer & Mariah N.
Samost, The Arbitration of Consumer Unfair Trade Practices Claims, (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/faIl20l 1-
arbitration-consumer-unfair-trade-practices-claim.html.
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